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, the court said: ''Whenever it appears
ccoLn.ucu.. the terms 'municipality' and
will be construed to include a county
p. 118;
Cal. 329
P.
; Union Stone Co. v. Board
71 N..J.Eq.
()57 I(if) ~\. 46(i] .) That
re, since 1Dl:1 at least,
intended that the word '
' as used in the title to
the Street
Bond Act of
should be emin its larger sense, so as to include counties as well as
eities and towns, is made manifest
the fact that in a new
added to the act in 1913 ( Stats. 1913, p. 351), it is
expressly declared that the work provided for by the Street
Improvement Bond Act may be performed in 'unincorporated
of counties,' and that wherever the words 'municipality,' 'municipalities,' or 'eity' appear in the act, 'they
shall be and are
defined as including cities, cities and
counties and counties, and are hereby expressly declared to
be interchangeable \Vith any or either of those terms.' ''
In Villanaztll v. City of Los Angeles, 37 CaL2d 718 [235
P.2d 16], the question raised was whether the city, county or
state was liable for the alleged negligence of one Gregg who
was a deputy marshal of the Municipal Court of the City of
Los Angeles. \Y e held ( p. 724) that ". . . the character of a
municipal court is not affected nor is its nature determined in
an:v ·way
the requirement that the city must assent to its
establishn1ent. 'rhe fundamental basis of the court, as fixed
by the Constitution and statutes, indicates that essentially it
is a creature
the county." (Emphasis added.) In Pacific
Coast Ry. Co. v. Pm·ter, 74 CaL 261, 262
P. 774], it was
helrl that " . . . the word 'municipal,' as used in the provision
L ~ 14 J, refers to such corporations as are for public
government, and therefore includes counties.'' In Beclter
Y. City of Albany, 47 CaLApp.2d 702 [118 P.2d 924], it was
helrl that nwmbers of a board of education were municipal
ofilcer:s: in Rock Creek etc. Dist. v. County of Calaveras, 29
CaL2d 7, 11 [172 P.2d 863], we
" No violenee is done
to the rules of construction under the interpretation of the
i erm "municipal corporations" here contended for. It is
eommon knowledge that in popular usage the term "municipal
eorporation'' is understood as applying to all departments of
state org·anization exercising public functions, and the same
general use of the term is common in judicial decisions and
with law text-writers. .
'" In In re Werner, 129 CaL
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567, 573
P. 97], this court said "In a
say that all law other than international law is ·molt.·w,,,,.,m,.
but when we speak of corporations as municipal we mean
cities or towns." (Emphasis added.) People v.
30
CaL 98, 99, holds that "municipal" means an inferior power
or jurisdiction rather than state
and the court
refused to interpret "
fine" to mean "state fine."
In support of
position that the
"munici·
pal officer'' is broad enough to include a county officer, various
constitutional provisions are cited not as
in point, but
to show that the word "municipal" often includes a county.
For example, article XI, section 18, is entitled "Municipal
Debt Incurred in Any Year not to Exceed Income-Exceptions." (Emphasis added.) The section commences with this
sentence: "No connty,
town, township, board of education, or school district, shall incur any indebtedness or liability . . . . ' (Emphasis added.
[10] Por the foregoing reasons, it appears that the words
"any municipal board or officer" are sufficiently broad and
were intended by the Legislature to include an officer or board
of a county and that the defendants' demurrer on the ground
that the time limited had run was improperly sustained.
THE PLEADINGS

Defendants also demurred on the ground that the complaint
did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
against them and that it was uncertain in specified particulars.
Defendants also moved to strike certain portions* of plaintiffs' complaint which motion was granted by the trial court.
Plaintiffs, after alleging their own licensed status, etc.
alleged : ''That in March, 1950, JOHN A. RAGGHIANTI and
H.osE RAGGHIAN'TI were the owners of a portion of the Rancho
San Miguel in Contra Costa County, California, and subdivided said portion into 220 lots as delineated and so designated on the subdiyision map thereof, which said map was
entitled 'Tree Haven, Contra-Costa County, California,' and
which map was filed in the office of the Recorder of said
Contra Costa County on March 31, 1950, in Volume 39 of
Maps, at page 40; that the real property upon which a lien
is claimed and which is sought to be impressed with a lien is
all of the real property within the exterior boundary lines
shown and designated on said map." Following this is an
allegation that John A. Ragghianti and Rose Ragghianti sold
*The portions so stri<,kcn are those which appear between brackets.
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persons may file for
within a certain time limitation,
with the
recorder of the
"in which such propthereof is situated a claim of lien containing
of his demand after deducting all just credits
the name of the owner or reputed owner, if
statement of the kind of work done or materials
him, or both, the name of the person
or
whom he furnished the rnaand a
of the
to be charged
with the lien sufficient for identification; which claim of lien
must be verified by oath of claimant or some other person.''
[12] A complaint to foreclose a mechanic's lien must show
a substantial compliance with the statute as to the contents
and
of the notice of lien (Barilari v. Ferrea, 59 Cal. 1;
Goss v. Strelitz, 54 CaL 640; McCreary v. Toronto Midway
Oil Co., 88 Cal.App. 17 [175 P. 87] .) Among other things
it must, either by direct allegation, or by an attached copy
of the notice of lien, show that the claim of lien contains
the name of the owner or reputed owner of the property, if
known, a sufficient description of the property ( Schalich
v. Bell, 173 Cal. 773 [161 P. 983] ), and is duly verified.
'rhe complaint must show that the claim of lien was filed
within the prescribed period ( C oft n v. Wright, 89 Cal. 86
[26 P. 643] ; 17 Cal.Jur. pp. 198, 194).
Defendants demurred on the ground that the plaintiffs'
failure to set forth the actual contents of the notice of lien
either by its legal effect, or 1:n haec verba, constituted a total
lack of compliance with the statutory provisions.
The allegations contained in Paragraph XII show that
on August 9, 195]. plaintiffs recorded a notice of lien with
the county recorder which contained the statements required
by section 1187 (heretofore set forth). It was also alleged
that plaintiffs "paid for verifying and recording said notice
of lien.'' 'While the allegation eoncerning verification could
have been more clearly set forth, it would appear that under
a liberal construction of the pleadings, it was sufficient.
Defendants contend that the allegations with respect to
the contents of the notice of lien recorded were but legal
('Onclusions and therefore insufficient. Reliance is placed on
Nodon v. Bedell Engineen:ng Co., 88 Cal.App. 777 [264
P. 311], in which the court pointed out that "[t]he only
allegations in the complaint with reference to the notice of
lien required by law to be filed, are found in paragraph five,
m< follows: 'That thereafter, to wit, on April 11, 1923, and
within thirty days after the filing of notice of completion of
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said structure on said building upon which said labor and
fixtures were furnished, and within the time
plaintiffs caused to be filed in the office of the County Reeorder of r~os Angeles county, California, in book 2048, page
] 86, of official reeords of said
a mechanic's lien for
said labor and material, and that said lien has not been released or satisfied in any way.' The
failed to
specify any of the material statements which may have been
contained in this notice of lien, as
section 1187
of the Code of Civil Procedure.
''Thereupon the appellants asked leave to amend their complaint by adding to paragraph five, above quoted, the following
language : 'That said mechanic's lien claim set forth that
plaintiffs actually furnished to the defendants the labor and
materia 1 actually used in the eollstnwtion of said building,
and that said labor was actually done and performed, that
said material was actually furnished, and actually entered into
the erection and construction of said building so described.'
~ \nd further: 'That the said lien set forth the names of the
owners as the defendants in this action. That it further set
forth that said owners contracted for said labor and materials
and caused said structure to be erected. That it further set
forth the date the said labor and material was furnished.
That it fnrther set forth the terms, time given and conditions
of said contract for said labor and the payment therefor.
That it further set forth that said contract had been fully
performed on the part of the claimants, plaintiffs in this
aetion. That it further set forth the date on which the said
material and labor was delivered and rendered, and when
they cease to furnish the same. That it further set forth
the date of the completion of said building. That it further
set forth the exact amount due after allowing all offsets and
credits. That it further set forth the fact that the plaintiffs
claim the benefit of the law of the State of California relative
to liens, mechanics' and laborers upon real property. And
fnrther that the claim is duly verified.' '' vVhen the trial
eourt stated to appellants' attorney that the amendment was
still defective because the complaint could not be amended
to state more than the lien showed, the attorney replied that
he conceded that "the lien does not state the kind of labor or
materials . . . . "
fn the Norton ease, snpra. the court quoted the provisions of section 1187 and stated that '' t will be observed
that the original complaint failed to allege any of the fore-
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in which
of Alameda, that
are
a elaim of lien
ment of his demand after
all
with the names of the said owners, and said
with a statement of the terms, time
and conditions of
plaintiff's
with said
of the said
the said
with said lien claimed by plaintiff; that said description vv-as sufficient for identification of said premises, said
property and that said statement and claim were duly verifi,d by the oath of plaintiff; that said claim of lien and statement was duly recorded by the said County Recorder in Liber
'C' of Mechanics' Lien, on page 281, to which lien and record
particular reference is herein made; and the same is herein
referrrd to and made a part hereof.'' The court held: '' 1. The
dr>murrer was properly overruled. The averments with respect to the lien are sufficient."
Defendants' next contention is that plaintiff failed to conform to the requirements of section 459 of the Code of Civil
Procedure in pleading an ordinance. That section provides
that "[i]n pleading a private statute, or an ordinance of a
county or municipal corporation, or a right derived therefrom, it is sufficient to refer to such statute or ordinance by
its title and the day of its passage . . . . " Plaintiff's pleaded
the ordinance by number but failed to give its title or date of
passage. Defendants rely upon Agnew v. City of Los Angeles,
99 Cal.App.2d 105 [221 P.2d 340], Redwood Theaters, Inc.
v. City of Modesto, 86 Cal.App.2d 907 (196 P.2d 119J, and
Bandini Estate Co. v. Payne, 10 Cal.App.2d 623 [52 P.2d
959], for the rule that '' [ m] ere reference to an Ordinance by
number is not sufficient."
[13] ·while an ordirwnee may be pleaded by the simplifierl
method provided for in section 459 (Code of Civil Procedure),
it may also be pleaded by setting forth the substance of the
provision relied upon (18 CaLJur. § 211, pp. 922, 923; Amestoy
v. Electric R. T. Co .. 95 Cal. 311 [30 P. 550); City of Tulare
v. Het!ren, 126 Cal. 226 f5R P. 5301; Simpson v. City of Los
Angeles, 40 Cal.2d 271 [2fl3 P.2d 464] ). This is what plaintiffs have done here.
It ·would appear from the forrgoing tl1at plaintiffs stated
a ranse of action for foreclosure of a mechanic's lien having
eomplicd with the statutory rel)nirements therefor and that
dr>fendants' demnn-er was improperly snstained.
[14] Ppon an appeal from the final judgment, this ronrt

:-;aid

Ct.E:~mxTs

Y. T. R BECHTEL Co.

[43 C.2cl

may review any intermediate
order or dewhich ineision, from whieh an appeal
volves the merits or
judgment (Code
Civ. Proe., § 956; lfienzic:s v. Geophysical
Inc., llG
Cal.App.2d 419 [254 P.2d 51]). The trial eourt here granted
defendants' motion to strike various portions of plaintiffs'
complaint. The portions of the complaint so stricken were
essential to plaintiffs' cause of action to foreclose the mechanic's lien and the motion should not have been
I•'or example, all of Paragraph XI was, on motion, stricken.
This paragraph, which has been heretofore commented upon,
was a vital part of plaintiffs' cause of action inasmuch
as it set forth in substance the ordinance upon which plaintiffs relied to show that the county surveyor had not inspeeted, or accepted, the work done by plaintiffs so as to
bring them within that portion of section 1191, subdivision
(Code of Civil Proeeclure), providing that the elate of eompletion-the time the period of limitation eommenced to run-was
the date of sneh acceptance. Also stricken from the complaint
were the allegations setting forth the statements eontained in
the claim of lien as filed with the County Recorder which
were required by seetion 1187 of the Code of Civil Proeedure.
[15] While a motion to strike is addressed to the sound diseretion of the trial court (Code Civ. Proc., § 452; Colden v.
Broa.dway State Bank, 11 Cal.App.2d 428 [53 P.2d 983] ), a
matter which is essential to a cause of action should not be
strieken (Johnson v. Central Aviation Corp., 103 Cal.App.2d
102, 105, 106 [229 P.2d ll4]) and it is error to do so (Menzies
v. Geophysical Service, Inc. 116 Oal.App.2d 419, 422, 424
[254 P.2d 51]; Allerton v. King, 96 Cal.App. 230, 234 [274
P. 90]).
Plaintiffs having stated a cause of action, it appears
to us that the trial court erroneously granted defendants'
motion to strike and that it was error to sustain defendants'
demurrer to the complaint. Plaintiffs having stated a cause
of action, it was not necessary for them to file an amended
eomplaint.
The judgment is reversed.
Shenk, Acting C. J., Traynor, J., Schaner, J., Spence, J.,
and Bray, J. pro tern.,* concurred.
EDMONDS, J.-I concur in the conclusion that the county
surveyor is a municipal officer within the meaning of section
*Assigned by Chairman of ,Judicial Council.
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subdivision
, of the Code of Civil Procedure. The
claim filed
the plaintiffs therefore was not barred by lapse
of time.
in my opinion the special demurrer on the ground
and
properly was sustained, but
the order should have allowed the claimants leave to amend.
For these reasons, I concur in the
of reversal.
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In re VINCENT W. 111\LLI~A~ for Disbarment of Member

of State Bar of California.
Attorneys-Disciplinary Proceedings-Proceedings on Conviction of Crime Involving Moral Turpitude.-An attorney whose
disbarment is sought on ground of conviction of crime involving moral turpitude has not made required showing of discrimination to sustain his contention that he is being denied
equal protection of the laws, where he has not directly challenged by appeal or otherwise propriety of his conviction for
violating Internal ReYenue Code, § 145, subd. (b), by willfully
and knov;ingly filing false and fraudulent income tax returns,
and where he has not shown that others demonstrably guilty of
violating such section have not been prosecuted or that the
section is administered discriminatorily against a class to which
he belongs.
[2] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Conviction of Crime Involving
Moral Turpitude.-An attorney whose disbarment was sought
on the ground that he had been convicted, after trial, of a
crime involving moral turpitude was not entitled to claim discrimination because the State Bar failed to proceed against
other attorneys who had pleaded nolo contendere, and the
State Bar was justified in treating· such plea as not being the
equivalent of a plea or verdict of guilty within the meaning
of Bus. & Prof. Cod<>, § 6101, prior to 1953 amendment.
[3] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Conviction of Crime Involving
Moral Turpitude.-A crime in which intent to defraud is essential element is a crime inYolving moral turpitude.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law,§ 117.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 73 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Attorneys at Law, § 279 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 9-11, 14) Attorneys,§ 172..'5; [2-8, 12)
Attorneys,§ 141; [13] Courts,§ 106; [15] Attorney,§ 172.

